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Abstract: This paper highlights and unpacks a little-known reality about the Financial Accounts 
of the United States: the Flows matrix on page 1 of the Federal Reserve’s quarterly Z.1 report 
does not explain period-to-period changes in the Levels matrix on page 3. The same is true of the 
sectoral Flow and Levels tables underlying those matrixes. Nor do those tables provide balance-
sheet-complete accounting of household or national wealth accumulation. Measures of net 
saving/investment/capital formation and accumulation, and national wealth accumulation, 
diverge by tens of trillions of dollars. The discrepancy is explained and resolved by assembling a 
balance-sheet-complete empirical derivation of comprehensive U.S. household “Haig-Simons” 
income (formerly the “preferred” income measure among economists and national accountants), 
based on the Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts. The comprehensive measure is 23% higher 
than national accounts’ “primary” household income. Relationships to the Piketty/Saez/Zucman 
Distributional National Accounts (DINAs) are discussed, along with implications for economic 
theory and empirical modeling, both mainstream and heterodox/Post-Keynesian. 
=================== 
 
In the June, 2018 release of its quarterly Z.1 report (“Financial Accounts of the United States”), 
the Federal Reserve includes a “Highlight” note that will appear to many as just a trivial change 
in terminology (emphasis added).1 
 
As of this publication, the term “flow” is being replaced by the term “transactions.” The 
concept being referred to, which is the acquisition of assets or incurrence of liabilities, is not 
being changed. The change in terminology is intended to prevent confusion with the 
broader concept sometimes called “economic flow,” which is the change in level from one 
period to the next and is composed of transactions, revaluations, and other changes in 
volume. The new terminology brings the Financial Accounts of the United States into better 
alignment with international guidelines in the System of National Accounts 2008 
(SNA2008).2  
 
This is more than just a label change. The note acknowledges a reality that has always existed in 
the Fed’s Flow of Funds (FOF) accounting, but that many may find deeply surprising: the 
sectoral Flows (now Transactions) matrix on page 1 of the Z.1 doesn’t explain period-to-period 
changes in the Levels matrix on page 3. Not even close. The same is true of the sectoral (F)low 




2 The Transactions tables still retain the F prefix in their titles: F.101, for instance, for the household-sector 
Transactions table. 
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This discrepancy exists mostly because the Levels tables tally sectoral asset holdings at end-of-
period market prices; they mark assets to market. A market price runup during a period increases 
sectors’ asset holdings, and the total stock of assets. But that price-driven increase — 
“(re)valuation” in modern national-accounting-speak, as distinguished from “volume” 
changes — is absent from the Transactions/Flows matrix, and tables. Holding gains/losses are 
ignored and invisible therein. Tens of trillions of dollars in wealth accumulation over past years 
and decades remains unexplained by the accounted transactions.3 
 
Additionally, the Levels tables aren’t complete balance sheets; they only tally financial assets. In 
particular, ownership holdings of real-estate titles (currently 23% of household assets) are absent. 
This makes the F tables even more “balance-sheet incomplete,” because they (necessarily) can’t 
and don’t tally revaluation of nonfinancial assets.  
 
If total financial assets (on the Levels tables) or total assets (on balance sheets) are the bottom-
line “stock” measures, the Flow of Funds matrix and tables aren’t “stock-flow consistent” (SFC). 
And widely-depicted “sectoral balances” — which are compiled from the flow of funds matrix 
and tables — are likewise balance-sheet incomplete. 
 
The Transactions-matrix accounting is of course necessary for complete SFC accounting, but 
isn’t itself fully SFC. It balances to zero (with statistical discrepancies), in a closed-loop or 
“circuitist” construct. It doesn’t balance to total (financial) assets, or net worth, which increase 
steadily, showing only one large (brief) drawdown since 1960, in 2008 (Figure 6). 
 
Enter the IMAs 
 
The Fed note’s reference to the System of National Accounts (SNAs) is significant. It silently 
gestures toward a separate set of national-accounting statements that are also included in the Z.1, 
as the S tables: the Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts.4 These accounts conform except in 
some details to the international SNA methodologies, concepts, and accounting structures, 
developed under the aegis of the United Nations. (Think “generally accepted accounting 
principles” or practices — GAAP — but for countries.) Equivalent standards and practices also 
necessarily apply to international Balance of Payments accounting. The IMA accounts are built 
upon the NIPA and Flow of Funds’ measures and underlying data sources, but expand on them 
to provide balance-sheet-complete accounting of “economic flows,” and complete balance sheets 
for all sectors.5  
																																																								
3 The Levels tables’ mark-to-market methodology adds sectors’ accrued gains to their holdings, whether or not 
individual asset holders might have “realized” some of those gains (so must report them for tax purposes) — 
exchanged their variable-priced assets with other asset holders for fixed-price “M” assets. Those 
exchanges/“realizations” are dollar-for-dollar swaps; they add no assets to any balance sheet, individual or 
sectoral. The markup-to-market accounting events are what add assets to wealthholders’ brokerage account 
statements (updated instant by instant), and to individual and sectoral balance sheets.  
4 The IMAs’ annual tables were released in 2006, with coverage back to 1960; quarterly tables were released in 
2012. 
5 The Flow of Funds have developed (B)alance sheet tables for three “real” sectors — notably households — over 
past decades, along with necessary (R)econciliation tables that include measures of both valuation and volume 
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Economist remain largely unaware of the IMAs, and their import. A RePEc/Ideas literature 
search for “integrated macroeconomic accounts” yields only eight hits over the fifteen years 
since the accounts were released. 
 
The IMAs achieve complete SFC accounting by adding two necessary accounts explicitly 
mentioned in the Fed note, that are absent from the FOFs and NIPAs: Revaluation, and Other 
Changes in Volume. The representation of the IMAs’ account structure (Figure 1), plus a 
simplified diagram depicting the IMAs’ derivation of change in net worth from period start to 









changes. But tracking derivations for these sectors across four tables (F, L, R, and B) — much less across 
sectors — is challenging even for accounting adepts. This especially as Balance Sheet and Reconciliation tables 
are not provided for financial, government, or rest of world sectors. 
6 Cagetti, Marco and Holmquist, Elizabeth and Lynn, Lisa and Hume McIntosh, Susan and Wasshausen, David, 
“The Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts of the United States” (January 7, 2013). Available at SSRN: 
ssrn.com/abstract=2197527 or dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2197527. p. 3. 
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Figure 2. The accounting pathway for the IMAs’ derivation of change in sectoral net worth. 
 
Somewhat simplified: The NIPAs encompass the Current and Capital accounts. The FOFs add 
the Financial account (and a whole pyramid of underlying financial details tables — the 
“Financial Accounts” — plus a range of “statistical” data on the financial sector(s), especially 
banks). The IMAs complete the accounting of “economic flows” (hence wealth accumulation) by 
1. adding the Revaluation and Other Changes in Volume accounts for all sectors, 2. including 
nonfinancial assets in its tallies, and 3. tallying complete balance sheets for all sectors.  
 
Here’s the IMAs’ precise derivation of change in net worth — line 96 from table S.3.a, the 
IMAs’ Household-sector table, as an example: 
 
“Change in net worth (lines 32+38+78+95)” 
 
And here, those line numbers expanded: 
 
Starting Net Worth 
32: +Capital formation, net, Capital account 
38: + Net lending (+) or Net borrowing (-), Capital account7 
																																																								
7 Theoretically, this capital-account measure should be identical to net lending/borrowing for the financial account. 
They vary only by the statistical discrepancy; the two accounts measure different things using different sources 
and methodologies. In the IMAs that discrepancy is included in, and added to balance sheet assets via, the Other 
changes account. With that somewhat hidden addition, the IMAs’ actual operative “volume” change in net worth 
from Net Lending/Borrowing is for the Financial (vs the Capital) account. This is necessary to achieve accounting 
coherence with the ultimate balance-sheet bottom line: change in monetary net worth — total assets minus total 
liabilities. 
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    (N.B.: Net capital formation - Net borrowing = Net Saving, Current account) 
78: + Total other volume changes, Other Changes in Volume account 
95: + Changes in net worth due to nominal holding gains/losses, Revaluation account 
= Ending Net Worth 
 
A plot of those four measures using the household sector as an example (Figure 3) imparts a 
sense of their relative magnitudes. (The household sector is shown because it’s effectively the 
top of the accounting-ownership pyramid; the market-cap value of all domestically-held U.S. 






Figure 3. Derivation measures for changes in household net worth. IMAs Household Table S.3.  
The bottom panel zeroes out holding gains to give a better picture of the other three measures. 
(N.B.: in the IMAs, the small measure of disaster losses is tallied via the Other Changes in 
Volume account.) fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=C6by 
 
Sectoral-balances graphs represent only one of these measures: sectors’ net lending/borrowing. 
While this measure can be revealing and meaningful, the magnitude is fairly small in the context 
of total economic flows, especially complete “economic flows” that comprise wealth 
accumulation. 
 
One significant terminology difference is worth noting. Where the NIPAs’ and the FOFs’ labels 
refer to “investment” (spending), the IMAs opt for “capital formation.” The measures are 
empirically equivalent, but the concepts are different. Investment spending — paying people and 
firms to produce goods that are not consumed within the accounting period — is what causes 
“real” capital formation.8 (Alternately: capital formation as observed on units’ capital accounts, 
																																																								
8 One important detail difference is also worth noting. The NIPAs treat household purchases of consumer durables 
(vehicles are the largest component) as consumption spending, not investment. The FOFs treat them as 
investment. The IMAs do neither; consumer-durables purchases are squirreled away in the catch-all Other 
Changes in Volume account. For the  purposes of tallying stock measures, however — balance-sheet assets — all 
accounts (necessarily) treat durables purchases as if they were investment, adding to sectoral stocks of 
nonfinancial assets. (They are likewise depreciated as part of Consumption of Fixed Capital, CFC.) They’re 
included as an asset category on household hence national balance sheets (B.1, B.101, and S.3). The dollar 
magnitude of durables purchases is not insignificant. If they’re added to and included as part of Gross Private 
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especially firms’, can be subtracted from total spending on final goods, also observed, to derive 
consumption spending for purchases of goods that are consumed within the period.) 
 
Household vis-a-vis Firms’ Capital Formation: Book versus Market value 
 
To be clear: most national capital formation, which is primarily done by firms, is invisible in this 
household-sector view. (See ensuing graphs for national and all-sector measures.) But firms’ 
capital formation does ultimately redound to household balance-sheet assets. Increases in firms’ 
book value from capital formation affect the firms’ share prices hence market-cap value on 
household balance sheets.9 (Though that causal relationship, embodied in quite variable book-to-
market ratios, is perhaps irreducibly indeterminate/unpredictable.)  
 
While capital formation by firms (owned by households) is the ultimate “source” of much new 
household wealth, most of the new capital-asset value actually arrives on household balance 
sheets through  holding gains — new assets created out of mark-to-market thin air. Markets 
observe the firms’ new/increased capital/book value, and bid up share prices, increasing 
households’ asset holdings as they’re marked to market (mostly, instantly by brokerages). In 
accounting terms, those household gains don’t “flow from” anywhere; no sector posts new 
offsetting liabilities when asset prices rise.10 This explains why the “economic flow” of capital 
gains is absent from the “flow of funds.”  
 
If firms’ capital formation, increase in book value, is “backed-out” of households’ holding gains, 
attributed instead to capital formation, the household holding gains measure is reduced, and the 
capital formation measure is increased. In particular since the 1990s, however, household asset 
accumulation from equity holding gains has greatly outpaced increases in firms’ book value — 
even if annual changes are tallied in inflation-adjusted dollars to estimate their ending, 
cumulatively-summed “real” or “current-cost” value (Figure 4).11 
 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Domestic Investment, for instance, they comprise 25–30% of that total private investment measure. Because 
durables depreciate rapidly, however, the durables stock is only about 15% of household nonfinancial assets. 
9 Firms’ book value is also reduced by dividend distributions, share buybacks, and taxes paid; the remainder is 
retained earnings, which equals firm-sector Saving. Since firms by construction do no consumption spending in 
any national accounts, their retained earnings/saving equals their “disposable income.” This effectuates Piketty’s 
words: “it is better to treat retained earnings as savings realized on behalf of the firm’s owners and therefore as a 
component of private saving.” Capital, p. 177. 
10 As a result, the outstanding stock of financial assets does not equal the outsanding stock of liabilities — a 
widespread truism — though issuers’ liabilities and holders’ assets are generally equal at issuance. This is 
manifest for equities, but starting with the March 2019 Z.1 report, the Fed even started explicitly reporting 
market-to-book asset “discrepancies” for treasury, agency, municipal, corporate, and foreign bonds. 
11 Saez and Zucman provide a very coherent discussion of this topic in the 2019 online appendix to Triumph of 
Injustice. eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/SZ2019Appendix.pdf. Based on historical figures, they use a “backout” amount 




Figure 4. Annual measures for each series are inflation-adjusted prior to summing/addition, to 
estimate the ending cumulative sums in “real” or “current-cost” terms.
12 
 
A similar picture pertains to real estate, holdings of land titles as assets. Nominal revaluation 
gains on those holdings sum to $24T over six decades — in the same ballpark as equity holding 
gains. A comparable measure of “book value” accumulation for real estate, however, is 
conceptually and empirically much more difficult to assemble. 
 
The accounting of comprehensive household income below (Figure 11) sidesteps or “leaps over” 
this issue of imputing corporate retained earnings to the households sector’s income and wealth. 
It simply treats holding gains as household income, whether they result from “volume” changes 
in firms’ retained earnings/book value, or “valuation” changes due to shifts in the equity 
markets’ prices/book-to-market ratio. Whatever the cause, when household equity-share gains 
are accrued via mark-to-market accounting events, equity-owning households have more assets 
and net worth. 
 
Moving from household to total-economy or “national” measures (so obviating the need to break 
out firms’ book-value changes, which are resolved in the national aggregate measures), the 
discrepancy between saving/investment/capital formation and changes in wealth is equally 
apparent (Figure 5). 
																																																								
12 Cumulative-sum measures in this paper simply implement accountants’ standard “perpetual inventory method”: 





Figure 5. The top two lines depict quarterly changes in two alternate Fed measures of national 
wealth (table B.101 “U.S. Net Wealth,” and S.3 household Net Worth). The remaining measures 
are flows. All measures are in nominal dollars. Note that “net” measures here are all net of 
Consumption of Fixed Capital (depreciation); that consumption is “pre-deducted.” CFC + 
Consumption Expenditures could be called total or “gross” consumption.   
fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=CSDQ. 
 





Figure 6. Measures of wealth and capital accumulation. Since these measures are all in nominal 
dollars, the righthand-side sums (e.g. $118T in 2020 end-of-year household net worth) are 
dominated by accumulation over recent years and decades. fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=CSDQ 
 
Stock measures of wealth and capital, likewise, are very different (Figure 7). Measures of the 
capital stock are presented at inflation-adjusted “current” or replacement cost. (Employing 





Figure 7. Stock measures of U.S. wealth and capital. The fixed-assets/capital measure here is in 
constant 2012 dollars. The other three measures are wealth estimates, with one also deflated for 
comparison using the GDP deflator, in 2012 dollars. fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=DF2Q 
 
Another construction depicting sources of new private-sector assets paints a similar picture 
(Figure 8) depicting the “ultimate” sources of new assets. 
 
 
Figure 8. Source series: fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=vAIu 
 
Rather surprisingly given the difficulty of economic measurement, this $123T estimate of 
cumulative asset creation over forty-five years exactly matches total household asset holdings at 
the end of 2018. 
 
By any of these national measures of “what we produce minus what we consume,” a great deal 
of national wealth accumulation, and national wealth, remains unexplained. Holding gains are 
the missing 8,000-pound elephant in the room. (Other Changes in Volume is minor by 
comparison, and is largely a matter of labeling and categorization choices.) That elephant is 
invisible in the Flow of Funds matrix and tables; they are an incomplete model of wealth 
accumulation. But that incomplete model silently serves as the basis for almost all theoretical 
and empirical, accumulation-based macroeconomic growth modeling, both mainstream and 
heterodox. 
 
Neoclassical and Post-Keynesian Accumulation Modeling 
 
For any economic model or theory in which capital or wealth (accumulation) measures have an 
operative effect — on production, investment, spending, income, or income’s residual, saving, 
etc. — the large empirical wealth-capital discrepancy seems to require careful consideration. 
“Capitalists’” return on capital, for instance (capital’s “productivity” or “efficiency”), is very 
different from wealthholders’ total return on balance-sheet assets, wealth. But both mainstream 
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and heterodox theories and models commonly, and mostly silently, treat the two measures (and 
ratios/returns) as equivalent. 
 
That conflation is perhaps stated most explicitly by Thomas Piketty in Capital (p. 59): “To 
simplify the text, I use the words ‘capital’ and ‘wealth’ interchangeably.” In that book’s “second 
fundamental law of capitalism,” β [wealth or capital over national income]=saving/national-
income growth, wealth can only increase via saving, a.k.a. capital formation. Return on capital 
and return on wealth are treated as equivalent. 
 
Another clear example arises in a heavily-cited workhorse neoclassical model (Kotlikoff and 
Summers, 1981) that seeks to explore the effects of intergenerational wealth transfers.13 A 
passage discussing wealth accumulation suddenly becomes an explanation, proof, or test of 
capital formation. Emphasis added. 
 
...These profiles are combined with data on rates of return to calculate a stock of life-cycle 
wealth. This stock of lifecycle wealth is compared with aggregate wealth holdings in the 
United States. If there were no intergenerational transfers, the stock of life-cycle wealth 
would exactly equal total U.S. wealth. When intergenerational transfers occur, these two 
stocks differ by an amount equal to the stock of net received transfers. Hence, comparing 
total wealth with life-cycle wealth indicates whether the life-cycle model alone can 
explain aggregate U.S. capital formation.  
 
No explanation is given for the sudden shift in terms; the capital/wealth equivalency is just 
silently assumed — both in this verbal description, and in the paper’s formulaic expressions of 
the accumulation mechanism. 
 
The same situation exists in almost all post-Keynesian work, both theoretical and empirical. In 
The Rise and Fall of Money Manager Capitalism,14 for instance, Eric Tymoigne and L. Randall 
Wray state that “saving represents the change in net worth (S = ΔNW).” (p. 20) As we have seen 
above, it doesn’t. A recent paper using “a calibrated Post-Keynesian model” (Ederer and Rehm, 
2020), displays the equivalence clearly in a stocks and flows table for a two-sector economy 
(three, if you treat the “functional classes” of workers and capitalists as separate sectors). See 
Figure 9.15 
																																																								
13 Kotlikoff , Laurence J. and Summers , Lawrence H. “The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital 
Accumulation.” 1981, Journal of Political Economy vol. 89, no. 4. p. 706. Available online: 
piketty.pse.ens.fr/fichiers/enseig/ecoineg/articl/KotlikofSummers1981.pdf. To complicate this study, the authors’ 
wealth measures are not “directly” observed; they are themselves complexly- or even circularly-modeled 
estimates: “A variety of historical U.S. data detailing population, labor earnings, consumption, and government 
taxes and transfers are used to directly estimate the shapes of historic age-earnings and age-consumption profiles. 
These profiles are combined with data on rates of return to calculate a stock of life-cycle wealth.”  
14 Tymoigne, Eric and Wray, L. Randall, 2014. The Rise and Fall of Money Manager Capitalism. Routledge. 
bit.ly/2PVfGIR 
15 Ederer, Stefan and Rehm, Miriam. “Will wealth become more concentrated in Europe? Evidence from a 
calibrated Post-Keynesian model.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Volume 44, Issue 1, January 2020, Pages 




Figure 9. Flows and stock matrix from a neo-Kaleckian SFC model. 
 
Change in households’ stock of wealth (ΔV) equals change in firms’ stock of capital, which is 
itself purely a function of firms’ investment spending.16 This exactly embodies the closed-circuit, 
balance-to-zero accounting of the FOF Transactions matrix. Another recent paper in the same 
modeling tradition (Palley 2017), which “serves as a valuable starting point for” the previous 
example, parenthetically acknowledges the same capital-wealth conflation: “workers have a 
positive propensity to save so that they own part of the capital stock (wealth).” (p. 4)17 
 
The situation pertains back into the Kalecki profit equation (and into Keynes, and beyond), 
which likewise doesn’t incorporate complete economic flows including revaluation, so can’t 
explain wealth accumulation. “What remains possible,” per two Kalecki commentators (Laski 
and Herbert, 2013), “are speculative bubbles that may increase as long as the capital gains 
remain notional, i.e. are not realized on a larger basis.”18 This recourse to “bubbles” implies a 
widely held but empirically unfounded belief: that accrued capital gains are mere volatility, just 
oscillation around some “true,” imagined value of wealth. As depicted in the decades-long and 
very large positive accumulation of unexplained capital gains above, that belief does not hold 
empirically. 
 
This widespread and often-silent conflation yields a problematic result: when the words wealth 
or capital are used in these economic writings, the reader, at least, has no idea which concept or 
measure is being discussed. In Paul Romer’s words (p. 89), “it leaves ample room for slippage 
between statements in natural versus formal language.”19 Piketty’s desire to “simplify the text” is 
																																																								
16 Quite admirably given the general silence on this topic, the authors state the omission explicitly, though not until 
the paper’s final paragraph: “we abstract from asset prices and capital gains, which would likely increase the gap 
in the differential returns of workers and capitalists.” 
17 Palley, Thomas, 2017. “Inequality and growth in neo-Kaleckian and Cambridge growth theory.” Review of 
Keynesian Economics, vol. 5, no. 2, 146–69. ideas.repec.org/p/imk/wpaper/167-2016.html 
18 Laski, Kazimierz and Walther, Herbert. “Kalecki’s Profit Equation after 80 Years.” Working paper, Vienna 
Institute for International Economic Studies, 2013. bit.ly/3sV93EB  
19 Romer, Paul. “Mathiness in the Theory of Economic Growth.” American Economic Review: Papers & 
Proceedings 2015, 105(5): 89–93. dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20151066 
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understandable, but the capital/wealth conflation arguably delivers confusion rather than 
simplicity. 
 
Enter Comprehensive Income 
 
The discrepancy between measured capital accumulation and wealth accumulation can be quite 
clearly understood in accounting terms by revisiting the concept and measure of “income,” and 
its residual, “saving.” Until the mid-20th century, the “preferred” income measure was “Haig-
Simons” income. We’ll refer to it here as “comprehensive income,” to distinguish it from 
“primary income.” (In the IMAs/SNAs’ careful usage, it’s called “Net national income/Balance 
of primary incomes.”) 
 
Primary income is what most economists are familiar with. Ignoring transfers for the moment to 
focus on market income (see “Transfers” in Appendix), for households it consists of 1. labor 
compensation (wages, salaries, and employers’ social contributions) and 2. property income 
(dividends, interest, and pass-through profits from business ownership). In IRS terminology, 
they’re earned and unearned income. 
 
Comprehensive Haig-Simons income adds the measure that’s included via the IMAs’ 
Revaluation account, but that is absent from the Flow of Funds: 
 
Comprehensive Haig-Simons income  
= Primary income + accrued capital gains  
= Consumption spending + change in net worth 
 
This definition has the advantage of comporting quite simply with “what we’ve produced minus 
what we’ve consumed” understandings of accumulation. Comprehensive saving would simply 
equal change in net worth. (Alternately, we could abjure the word “saving” entirely, and just say 
“change in net worth.”)20 
 
Comprehensive saving   
= Comprehensive income – consumption expenditures  
= Change in net worth 
 
In this construction and usage, “saving” fully explains wealth accumulation. 
 
These definitions may seem radical today because “that’s not how income and saving are 
defined.” But from its development in the late 1800s/early 1900s into the 1940s and beyond, 
comprehensive income was the “preferred” measure.  
 
																																																								
20 A perhaps-troubling implication arises here: if total wealth based on current asset-market prices is the asset 
markets’ best estimate (or at least index) of “what our stuff is worth,” that means we’ve been seriously 
undercounting output, GDP, at least since the 1990s. It also suggests that productivity (growth) over that period — 
output per hour worked — has not been nearly as lackluster as it appears in balance-sheet-incomplete GDP-based 
measures. 
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In Value and Capital (1946), for instance, John Hicks discusses income as “consumption plus 
capital accumulation” at chapter length (even going so far as to say that it’s “completely 
objective”).  
 
The capital value of the individual’s property at the beginning of the week is an 
assessable figure; so is the capital value of his property at the end of the week; thus, if we 
assume that we can measure his consumption, his income ex post can be directly 
calculated. (pp. 178–179.) 
 
In the International Monetary Funds’ 1995 Tax Policy Handbook (p. 117), John R. King 
describes Haig-Simons income (even quoting Simons directly) as “probably the most influential 
definition of the personal income of an individual, in a particular period of time.”21 
 
In a 2011 paper22 (pp. 34–35), Anthony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez speak of 
“a ‘preferred’ definition of income, such as the Haig-Simons comprehensive definition, which 
includes such items as…accruing capital gains and losses.” They explain that less-complete 
income measures are largely a result of measurement difficulty; available economic income data 
has traditionally relied heavily on tax returns. (Emphasis added.) 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect that affects the comparability of [income] series over 
time within each country has been the erosion of capital income from the progressive 
income tax base. Early progressive income tax systems included a much larger fraction of 
capital income than most present progressive income tax systems. Indeed, over time, many 
sources of capital income, such as interest income or returns on pension funds, have been 
either taxed separately at flat rates or fully exempted and, hence, have disappeared from 
the tax base.  
 
In all cases, only realized capital gains are included, if at all, in tax statistics and no 
information on accruing capital gains is available. 
 
These measures’ exclusion from tallies of income (hence saving) is to a great extent just an 
artifact of their exclusion from the tax base. (Both exclusions, it’s worth noting, are deeply 
congenial to wealthholders.) 
 
Directly addressing the issue of “Measuring Income for Distributional Analysis,” Joseph 
Rosenberg of the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (2013) devotes a footnote to this topic. 
	
Many annual economic income measures are based on the Haig-Simons definition of 
income—equal to current consumption plus the change in net wealth. However, data 
limitations and administrative constraints on the tax system (e.g., difficulty in including in the 
tax base the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing and capital gains on an accrual basis) 
make a full construction of Haig-Simons income problematic.23 
																																																								
21 King, John R. “The Concept of Income.” In Shome, Parthasarathi, ed. Tax Policy Handbook. Washington, 
International Monetary Fund, 1995. bit.ly/3wrEEQv. 
22 Saez, Emmanuel and Zucman, Gabriel. “Progressive Wealth Taxation.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
September 2019. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Saez-Zucman_conference-draft.pdf 




The opening sentence is surprising given how rare Haig-Simons is in recent decades’ economics 
literature, but the rest highlights the difficulties at the tax-microdata level that have contributed 
to that rarity. The issue remains in 2020, in a footnote to the “choice of income” section of a 
BEA working paper for developing prototype distributional income accounts (Fixler, 2020).24 
 
Despite their understanding of comprehensive income, Piketty and company largely abjure it as a 
measure. Their Distributional National Accounts (DINAs), for example, explicitly set out to 
depict the distribution of “national” (primary) income. Those accounts’ additional measures of 
distributional income that do include capital gains only treat realized gains — leaving those 
measures still deeply incomplete by comprehensive-income standards based on accrued, mark-
to-market gains (Figure 10).25 
 
 
Figure 10. Realized and reported versus balance-sheet accrued capital gains.  
 
																																																								
24 Fixler, Dennis, Marina Gindelsky, and David Johnson. “Measuring Inequality in the National Accounts.” BEA 
working paper, updated December 2020. Note 4, p. 2. bea.gov/system/files/papers/measuring-inequality-in-the-
national-accounts_0.pdf 
25 Note that PSZ’s work on wealth levels, changes, and shares does necessarily incorporate unrealized capital gains 
“under the hood,” because their method is based on the relationship between observed wealth (changes) which 
have to include those gains, total rates of return for wealthholders, and capitalizion ratios between those measures. 
But that balance-sheet-complete methodology is distinct from the (shares of) national income tallied in the 
DINAs. 
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Zucman and Saez do repeatedly invoke comprehensive, Haig-Simons income — though not by 
those names — in a 2009 Brookings paper, “Progressive Wealth Taxation.”26 They call it “true 
economic income” (nine usages in the paper). That term’s unstated derivation clearly embodies 
the complete “economic flows” mentioned in the Fed’s Z.1 note, and the Haig-Simons concept 
of comprehensive income: 
 
For as long as Bezos, Buffett, and Zuckerberg do not sell their stock, their realized 
income is going to be minuscule relative to their wealth and true economic income. 
(p. 18) 
 
The most complete discussions and employment of comprehensive Haig-Simons income in 
recent decades appear in Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie’s (G&L’s) Monetary Economics. The 
concept and term arise throughout the book — notably in a lengthy up-front section addressing 
firms’ book versus market-cap values, and net worth (though abjuring the term “book value”).27 
They also invoke it, though only in passing, in Appendix 12.1, which lays out the sectoral 
balances construct (again, not by that name): “NAFA [net accumulation of financial assets] is 
different from the increase in the wealth of households, ∆V, since it does not incorporate capital 
gains.”28 (p. 491) Page 33 offers a full-throated statement of their intentions: “This full 
integration will become possible only when capital gains are added to the transactions matrix.” 
That integration is well illustrated in the bottom sections of Tables 2.6 and 2.7 (pp. 39 and 44), 
and in the revaluation matrix of the Growth model, Table 11.2 (p. 380). Notably, tables 2.7 and 
11.2 are the only matrixes in the book that don’t balance to zero across the bottom. They balance 
to net worth. Capital gains are also included in Table 5.2, but as “only as a memo…capital gains 
have not been included within the definition of disposable income, but this of course is a matter 
of convention.” (Emphasis added.) Capital gains are not treated as income for modeling purposes 
in Model LP being discussed in that section, but the previous year’s change in wealth is included 
as a term in the consumption function (with a different multiplier than income).  
 
Other significant recent work on balance-sheet-complete modeling includes G&L-style SFC 
models by Genarro Zezza and Michalis Nikiforos,29 Patrizio Lainà’s 2019 “Money creation 
under full-reserve banking,”30 and Jacob Robbins’ 2018 “Capital Gains and the Distribution Of 
Income in the United States,”31 which employs a measure called Gross National [accrued] 
																																																								
26 brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Saez-Zucman_conference-draft.pdf 
27  Section 2.2.2 (pp. 27–31), “The balance sheet of production firms.”  
28 Terminology is again meaningful and significant here. G&L’s “NAFA” is net accumulation of financial assets — 
the financial account’s net acquisition of financial assets (also often called NAFA) minus net acquistion of 
liabilities. G&L’s NAFA equals net lending/borrowing, financial account — the measure depicted in sectoral 
balances graphs. Clearer usage might be: net asset accumulation - net liability accumulation = net net asset 
accumulation — G&L’s usage. This measure is a “volume” change, separate from any valuation changes. 
29 For an overview, see their 2017 Levy Economics Institute working paper, “Stock-flow Consistent Macroeconomic 
Models: A Survey.” levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_891.pdf 
30	Lainà, Patrizio. “Money creation under full-reserve banking: a stock–flow consistent model.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
Volume 43, Issue 5, September 2019, Pages 1219–1249, doi.org/10.1093/cje/bey034 
31 users.nber.org/~robbinsj/jr_inequ_jmp.pdf 
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Capital Gains” (GNKG), and seeks to accommodate balance-sheet-complete wealth 
accumulation within a neoclassical model. 
 
 
Deriving Comprehensive Income 
 
Perhaps the main reason for the rarity of balance-sheet-complete economic modeling and theory 
is the absence of a labeled, headline measure for comprehensive income in the national accounts. 
Even the IMAs don’t assemble such a measure. But doing so is fairly straightforward based on 
the IMAs’ complete accounting construct. Figure 11 shows such an effort for the household 
sector. It’s simply a condensed rearrangement, with some relabeling, of the IMAs’ S.3 household 
table.32 As a descriptive accounting model, it’s a “map of the same territory,” using the same 




32 A somewhat different arrangement and presentation would be useful for firms, because they don’t receive wages 
or do consumption spending, they do issue dividends, their saving equals their disposable income (equals retained 
earnings), they issue and sell ownership equity (and do share buybacks), and their pertinent bottom-line balances 
are book value and market capitalization, not net worth. (cf G&L, p. 31: “the measured net worth of firms 
[treating outstanding equity shares at market value as “liabilities”] is of no practical significance. Indeed, in the 
book, no behavioral relationship draws on its definition.”) Somewhat different treatments would also be 
appropriate for financial and government sectors. 
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Figure 11. Detail; the columns extend back to 1960. The 1960–2018 totals, and percentages 
derived from them, seek to provide a sense of the relative magnitudes for different measures over 
the long term. Since all measures are nominal, recent years and decades dominate in the totals. 
The complete table with source data and derivations is available as a Google Sheet here. 
 
Notably, this presentation doesn’t estimate production, value-added, or fixed-capital formation. 
And as discussed above, it doesn’t need to consider whether equity holding gains are a result of 
firms’ retained earnings (vs market share-price valuation changes). It simply shows changes to 
households’ accounted monetary wealth, and the “economic flows” that explain them.33 
 
The accounting choices behind these measures (labeling and categories) are detailed in the 
Appendix. But one significant departure from the IMAs’ “Net national income/Balance of 
primary incomes” bears highlighting here. The IMA measure treats interest payments as “uses of 
property income,” negative income. This negative-income treatment effectively makes $18T in 
income since 1960, invisible. (The Flow of Funds tables use this treatment as well.) Here, 
interest payments are posted instead under Uses, to give a more complete picture of property, 
primary, and comprehensive income. So, this primary income measure is about 5% higher than 
the IMA measure. Otherwise, it is the same as the NIPA, FOF, and IMA standard measures of 
primary sectoral income.  
Comprehensive Income in Pictures 
 
This accounting re-arrangement makes it easy to look at comprehensive versus primary income 
measures, as in the figures below. They impart a set of stylized facts that are quite different from 
those commonly accepted and employed by economists. Since the revaluation gains included in 
comprehensive income are by their very nature owners’ receipts of property income, for 
instance, the shares of labor/earned income versus ownership/unearned income are quite 
different (Figure 12). 
 
																																																								
33 This treatment ignores household-sector borrowing and loan payoffs, which expand/contract the household-sector 
balance sheet, affecting assets and liabilities equally, with no accounting effect on net worth or any measure of 
income (ignoring loan writeoffs). Additional rows or an addendum table could be added to tally these 
asset/liability changes. 
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Figure 12. 
 
It’s also worth noting that approximately 60% of U.S. household wealth is inherited.34 So 
approximately 25% of comprehensive household income is unearned property income received 
for having unearned wealth. 
 
Capital gains make comprehensive income quite volatile, though annual capital gains are almost 
always positive, or rarely near zero (Figure 13). 2008 is the big exception.   
 
																																																								
34 Alvaredo, Facuno, Garbinti, Bertrand, and Piketty, Thomas, 2017. “On the Share of Inheritance in Aggregate 
Wealth: Europe and the USA, 1900–2010.” Economica 84, 239–260. p. 240. 
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Figure 13. Sources of comprehensive income. 
Viewing annual comprehensive income components as cumulative sums provides a smoothed, 





The property-income share of comprehensive income is also quite volatile. Figure 15 depicts 
that, along with two standard BEA measures of “capital” income: share of GDP, and of nonfarm 
business income.  
 





35 Note that “under the hood,” these BEA measures attempt to categorize a portion of property income 
(“proprietors’” mixed income) as labor compensation for “productive” owners; they use very different 
methodologies. PSZ make similar adjustments in the DINAs. An equivalent adjustment of the comprehensive 
household income shares — necessarily somewhat arbitrary — would shift the blue line down a few points at 
most. 
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Looking at our measure of “comprehensive saving” — wealth accumulation as a percent of 
comprehensive income — we’re presented with a very different picture from the BEA’s personal 
saving rate, and potentially a very different understanding (Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16. BEA personal saving rate — 1-(personal consumption expenditures/disposable 
income) — for comparison. From fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PSAVERT 
 
If instead of saving and the “saving rate,” we instead focus on saving’s obverse, spending, we 
can assemble a more straightforward apples-to-apples view of things. Figure 17 depicts Personal 





Figure 17.  
 
Taxes as a percent of income also paint a very different picture (Figure 18).  
 
Figure 18. The tax measure in both series is the IMAs’ “Taxes on income, wealth, etc.” (federal, 
state, and local), sometimes labeled “personal taxes.” It does not include property or sales 
taxes. See Appendix. 
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The measures pictured here are examples of potential insights arising from comprehensive 
income and balance-sheet-complete wealth accounting. They suggest important possibilities for 
economic theory and modeling based on these purely monetary measures — avoiding the vexed 
national accounting theory and practice required to estimate “real” capital accumulation, and 




Appendix: Accounting for Comprehensive Income 
 
The spreadsheet shown in Figure 11, including all the source data, and derivations from the 
IMAs’ household Table S.3, is available at this link. 
 
Some of the measures in that figure (and in the IMAs) merit further explanation. The treatment 
already mentioned, of interest payments as “uses” rather than negative income as in the IMAs, is 
the primary difference. This choice means that primary income in this treatment is about 5% 
higher than the IMAs’ measure. Likewise, hence, comprehensive income. 
 
Property income. This treatment tallies what is here called primary property income plus other 
property income (equals comprehensive property income).  
 
Operating surplus. Unlike the IMAs, this presentation includes households’ net operating 
surplus as part of property income, rather than in its own standalone category. This measure 
tallies homeowner/occupiers’ imputed “landlord profit,” from renting their residences to 
themselves. (But see Interest Paid, below.) Both notionally and in practice, it’s compensation for 
ownership.  
 
Dividends, profits, and pass-throughs. These IMA measures are simply renamed to clarify 
their sources. The IMAs’ “dividends” measure also includes pass-through profits from S-corps 
whether distributed or not; S-corps are included in the “corporate” sectors. In other words, the 
IMAs’ “Distributed income of corporations” includes significant profits that aren’t distributed. 
An alternative approach would break pass-through S-corps out from C-corps, and include them 
with other (non-“corporate”) pass-through firms — partnerships, sole proprietorships, and LLCs 
(which can opt for either partnership or S-corp tax treatment).  
 
“Withdrawals from income of quasi-corporations” are pass-through profits from the 
noncorporate nonfinancial firms sector: partnerships37 and sole proprietorships. (This pass-
																																																								
36 As an example of purely monetary modeling based on the IMAs’ modern national wealth measures, see Roth, 
Steve, “How downward redistribution makes America richer: An empirical, ‘money view’ model of spending, 
wealth concentration, and wealth accumulation.” Real-World Economics Review, issue no. 95, March 2021,  
42–61. paecon.net/PAEReview/issue95/Roth95.pdf 
37 This also includes limited liability companies (LLCs, which are technically not “corporations”) that have made the 
IRS election to be treated as parterships (vs. S-corps). These non-“corporate” partnerships notably include most 
private equity funds, plus professional partnerships including doctors, lawyers…and accountants. (Hedge funds’ 
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through transfer means the noncorporate nonfinancial firms sector in the IMAs shows zero 
saving/retained earnings; that’s all imputed to their household owners.)  
 
Mixed income. There are certainly tricky “mixed income” issues related to profits and pass-
throughs. To what extent are partnership, sole-proprietor, and S-corp profits properly viewed as 
compensation for owners’ valuable work? But it’s worth noting that C-corp dividends plus S-
corp, partnership, and sole-proprietorship pass-through profits combined only comprise 11% of 
comprehensive income (15% of primary income). Allocating a portion of that to workers’ earned 
income (necessarily somewhat arbitrarily) only shifts worker vs owner shares by a few 









Other Changes in Volume. Of this category ($18T, 4% of comprehensive income), a third 
comes from the statistical discrepancy: Net financial assets in the financial account increased 
more than capital in the capital account. That additional increase is added to balance-sheet net 
worth via this measure. Another third is from Net investment in consumer durable goods (which 
arguably should be treated as net capital formation instead, as it is in the FOF accounts, but not 
in the NIPAs or IMAs). The final third is Other [other] volume changes. Disaster losses are a 
small additional category. None of these categories qualifies as earned labor income, so it’s all 
included here under Other (other) property income. 
 





is	appropriate because transfers by definition38 are made with no (expectation of) reciprocal 









profits — they’re mostly partnerships — are also largely included in household-sector accounting, though their 





earned	labor,	unearned	(comprehensive)	property,	and	net	transfers.	(Net capital transfers, 
by the way, are only about 0.1% of income.)	
 
Saving. This troublesome term is quite straightforward and intuitive when depicted as 
comprehensive saving. It’s just change in net worth. It’s also vastly larger than the standard 
primary saving measure. Over six decades it shows $66T in wealth accumulation, change in net 
worth, that’s unexplained by primary saving.  
 
Disposable income. Comprehensive disposable income subtracts taxes from comprehensive 
income. It’s equivalent to John Hicks’ measure of sustainable disposable income in Value and 
Capital (p. 182 e.g. in the 1946 edition) — how much can be spent while maintaining real net 
worth — but in nominal terms. After correcting for interest paid to get an apples-to-apples 
comparison with the IMAs, the comprehensive measure reveals $49T more disposable income 
over six decades than the IMAs’ primary disposable income — all “disposable” at the discretion 
of property owners who receive the extra property income.  
 
Comprehensive non-property income. This measure includes labor compensation and net 
transfers received. It’s the non-property share — useful for comparing comprehensive property 
income to all other household income. 
 
Interest paid. As discussed under Primary Income above, the IMAs treat interest paid as “uses 
of property income,” so as negative income. That bears unpacking. This measure includes 
mortgage interest plus interest on consumer (credit-card and car/boat) loans, and student-loan 
interest, etc. Theoretically, mortgage interest should be treated as uses of rental property income 
(actual income for landlords and imputed for owner-occupiers), and deducted from operating 
surplus so that measure depicts landlord profits. (The BEA’s “Rental income of persons,” NIPAs 
Table 7.9, does depict landlord profit this way: as net income or earnings after interest 
payments.)  
 
Non-mortgage interest, on the other hand, is very hard to construe as uses of property income. 
Interest on auto loans, eg, might be construed as uses of property income if the IMAs treated 
durable-goods purchases as capital formation, but that would require imputing the value of 
annual vehicle services as income (similar to the owner-occupier treatment), depreciating 
vehicles’ value (CFC), and including it all inside operating surplus. 
 
Rather than completely re-jiggering the IMAs’ treatments and greatly confusing the accounts 
here, interest paid including mortgage interest is all just posted under uses. This means 
“operating surplus” here (and in the IMAs) is quite different from homeowners’ owner-occupier-
landlord-imputed “profits” as depicted (arguably more completely and accurately) in Rental 
Income of Persons in NIPA tables 7.9, 7.4.5, and 7.12. 
 
Taxes. This is the  IMAs’ measure of “Current taxes on income, wealth, etc.” It overwhelmingly 
consists of federal and state income taxes, plus a small amount of estate/wealth taxes. 
Households’ sales and property taxes (only about one-tenth the amount of income/wealth taxes) 
are not included; they’re “Taxes on [products,] production and imports” which are “pre-
deducted” in the IMAs, treated as negative income. Taxes on C-corp profits are of course not 
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included here, though they could be imputed to equity-owning households as the firms’ owners 
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